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Toward a Unified and Reciprocal Disability System
By Paul Armstrong*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the fastest-growing areas of entitlement in our current
social benefit system is in the area of disability benefits. From very
modest beginnings in 1956, the Social Security Disability System
(SSD) in 2002 paid out a total of $68 billion2 to over 7 million
disabled workers and dependents. In addition, the federally
administered Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI) paid
benefits to another 6.8 million persons, totaling more than $34
billion, including about $4 billion in federally administered state
supplementation payments.4 Administering these two programs
through a myriad of regulations and successive administrative strata
is the largest unified adjudicatory system in the world, a system
costing approximately $2.5 billion and taking at times years to
adjudicate a claim.5 It is the purpose of this paper to examine: (1) the
* This article was written by Paul Armstrong in his private capacity. No
official support or endorsement by the Social Security Administration or the United
States is intended or should be inferred. S.?e 70 FR 7192.
1. GAO Report 02-597: SSA and VA Disability Programs: Reexamination of
Disability Criteria Needed to Help Assure Program Integrity, U.S. General
Accounting Office, August 2002, Figure 1, at 5 available at
http://www.gao.gov.new.items.d02597.pdf (last visited March 24, 2005).
2. Social Security Administration: Facts and Figures about Social Security:
General Information, August, 2003, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fastfacts/2003.
3. Id. Beneficiaries in Current Payment Status, 2002.
4. Social Security Administration, SSI Annual Statistical Report, 2002
(August 2003) available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ssi-asr/2002/ssi-asrO2.pdr [hereinafter
SSI Report].
5. Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX.
L. REv. 1003, 1016 (1998) [hereinafter Dissonant].
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current disability system and the its underlying principles, (2) the
political, economic, and legal changes that have occurred since its
inception, both inside and outside the system, and how those changes
impact the goals of the disability system, and (3) some proposed
changes in the goals and procedures of the disability benefit system
so as to bring it into accord with the changes that have occurred over
the years. Part I of this paper will give a brief overview of the Social
Security and SSI systems and how entitlement to benefits is
established. Part II will examine the societal, medical, economic, and
legal changes that have occurred both inside and outside these
systems which may necessitate changes in the disability benefit
policies underlying the SSD and SSI benefits system. Part III will
examine the current situation of disabled individuals in the U.S., the
conflicting views of the roles of disabled persons in our society, and
reform proposals for the system. Part -V suggests specific changes in
the system which may better implement a unified disability policy in
this country, with specific references to experience with disability
programs in private industry and other countries.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
As more fully discussed below, while the program has grown and
the character of the beneficiaries has changed over the years, the
basic principles and procedures underlying the administration of the
program have largely remained the same. Essentially, to qualify for
disability benefits, an individual must not be working, must establish
either that he is suffering from a severe medically-determinable
impairment that has lasted or is expected to last at least twelve
6
months or end in death, and meet the criteria of certain conditions
defined by the Social Security Regulations as presumptively
disabling (the Listings) 7 or that his impairments are so severe that he
cannot be employed at any occupation existing in significant
numbers in the regional or national economy.8 If the individual is a
worker who has earned over a minimum amount in at least twenty of
the last forty calendar quarters, 9 then that individual is paid in
6. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2005).
7. 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. A (2004).
8. 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (2004).
9. Social Security Administration: Annual Statistical Report on the Social
generally the same manner as if he had retired at full retirement age
on the date he became disabled, while if he does not meet this test for
insurability, then he is paid under the SSI only if he is indigent and
only at a minimal subsistence rate. 0 Both individuals will qualify for
government-paid medical care, the worker after a two-year waiting
period through the Social Security based Medicare program 1 and the
non-worker (usually) through needs-based federal-state Medicaid.'
2
The determination of a person's "disability" is first made by a state
Disability Determination Service which investigates the individual's
medical condition after his initial application at a local Social
Security Office and issues an initial (and sometimes second)
decision, and in the event of an appeal by a federal Administrative
Law Judge after a recorded hearing. 13 After a final decision of an
Administrative Law Judge, a person claiming disability benefits can
appeal to the Social Security Appeals Council and then to federal
court. 14
III. CHANGES REQUIRING MODIFICATION OF ORIGINAL SYSTEM
There are a number of factors that have converged at the turn of
this century to make our current disability system medically,
politically, socially, and economically unwise. In the first place,
changes in the definition of disabled individuals who qualify for
benefits have been substantially relaxed over the years both by
actions of Congress and court decisions. This has resulted in a
change in both the type of disability and the nature of the disabled
person, with younger beneficiaries and more transitory ailments
Security Disability Insurance Program, 2002 (August 2003), at 5, available at
http://ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di-asr/2001/di-asroO2.pfd [hereinafter SSD
Report].
10. The average monthly benefit under SSI in December, 2002 was $ 407. SSI
Report, supra note 4, at 1.
11. SSD Report, supra note 9, at 4.
12. Medicaid is a federal-state program that provides medical benefits to
people based on need. Title XIX establishes two groups of needy persons, one of
which is the "categorically needy" which are families with dependent children,
aged, blind or disabled people who receive financial aid from federal programs,
such as SSI. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(C), 1396a(a)(13)(B), 1396d(a)(l)-
(5)(1988). Some states do not make this automatic, however.
13. SSD Report, supra note 9, at 5.
14. Id.
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being represented. Advances in medical knowledge have minimized
the effects of many acute causes of disability, such as accidents and
infectious disease, allowed return to greater functionality through use
of prosthetics and rehabilitation programs, and have led to a greater
understanding of both the causes and the treatment of many chronic
causes of disability. Statutory action by Congress has resulted in
both the recognition and the implementation of principles of self-
reliance, independence, and integration in the field of disability and
public welfare law. But these changes have as yet not significantly
altered the basic principles underlying the SSD and SSI disability
benefit programs.
A. Changes in the Disability System and Beneficiaries Served
In discussing the disability system, it must be understood that the
actions of Congress and the courts over the years have created a
program far different from the one envisioned by the original writers
of the Social Security Disability legislation. The program as first
written was conceived as kind of an "early retirement" for
"permanently" disabled workers and thus was limited to workers
over fifty years of age. 15 Because of this age restriction, there was
little need to create an obligation on the part of the disabled workers
to participate in medical or vocational rehabilitation, an obligation
that opponents of the disability system felt was essential to its
integrity. 16 However, Congress in 1960 removed the restriction on
qualification for disability benefits to those under 50 years old 17 and
in 1965 replaced the requirement of permanent disability with a rule
that the disabling medical condition was expected to last at least a
year. 18 Equally significant was the judicial activism of the courts in
expanding the definition of disability in mental illness cases, a trend
most evident in the area of drug and alcohol addiction but common to
the entire gamut of mental disabilities, from mental retardation to
15. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2004).
16. Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: the Role of Disability in the
Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REv. 361, 406 (1996) [hereinafter
Entitlement].
17. Social Security Act Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, 401
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2005).
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depression. Because federal courts began requiring a more subjective
and individualized examination of the capacity of a person alleging
mental disability to work,' 9 awards for mental disabilities rose from
11% of SSD and 18% of SSI beneficiaries in 198120 to where today
they comprise almost a third of the SSD beneficiaries 2' and comprise
by far the largest (almost 6 in 10) category of SSI disability
recipients. 22 Because the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (Grids), 23
which now codified the more favorable treatment given to those over
fifty, could not arguably be applied in mental illness cases, by 2002
individuals with mental disabilities other than retardation comprised
by far the largest category of SSD beneficiaries under the age of
fifty.24 Significantly, a 2002 GAO Report noted that in 1999 one in
nine SSD beneficiaries suffered from an "affective disorder"
(depression, bi-polar, or other mood disorder) which SSA research
indicated could be controlled with appropriate treatment in as many
as 60% of the cases.25
In 1972, Congress merged the means-based state welfare
programs that formerly existed as the Aid to Totally and Permanently
Disabled (APTD) Program into a new SSI program that adopted the
same definition of disability as the SSD program.26  While this
program had formerly been administered by the states under broad
interpretations set out by the federal government, many states had
27interpreted the eligibility criteria in a liberal manner. The
establishment of SSI gave a uniform national eligibility criterion,
inflation-indexed benefits, and some perceived favored status to the
disabled GA beneficiaries as compared with other welfare
19. Jennifer Erkulwater, The Judicial Transformation of Social Security
Disability: The Case of Mental Disorders and Childhood Disability, 8 CONN. INS.
L.J. 401,415 (2001).
20. Social Security Reviews of the Mentally Disabled: Hearing before the
Special Committee on Aging, 98th Cong. 164-65 (1983).
21. SSD Report, supra note 9, at 2.
22. SSI Report, supra at note 4, at Table 25.
23. 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P App. 2.
24. SSD Report, supra note 9, at 98-10 1.
25. GAO Report 01-153: SSA Disability: Other Programs May Provide
Lessons For Improving Return-to-Work Efforts, U.S. General Accounting Office:
January, 2001, 29-30.
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d (2005).
27. Entitlement, supra note 16, at 429-31.
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28beneficiaries. However, the merging of the two disability benefit
programs under a definition of disability created under an "early
retirement" paradigm brought into play the very factors that
opponents of the program had feared would overcome it. As Diller
points out in his examination of the differing origins of the SSD and
APTD systems, opponents of the SSD system feared that it would
attract poor workers looking for an excuse to leave the workforce
29
and would create a significant disincentive on the part of those that
could work.30 The proponents of SSD countered that the requirement
of recent and sustained work activity, together with the minimum age
limitation of 50 set out above, effectively ensured the program
against these dangers. 31 The problem is that when the disability
programs expanded (through broadening of the statutory definition of
disability and incorporating SSI with no prior earnings requirement)
to cover younger individuals with more transitory (as opposed to
permanent) impairments and less connection to the workforce, they
had little or no mechanism for policing against the larger numbers of
younger individuals inevitably attracted by the benefits provided in
these programs. The Carter Administration addressed this issue
through disability act amendments in 1980 which mandated a
periodic review of the disability rolls to weed out such individuals, a
process that was pounced upon by the Reagan Administration in its
controversial and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to accelerate the
review process. 32  This same problem has been recognized and
addressed more recently in The Ticket to Work and Financial
28. Entitlement, supra note 16, at 445-46.
29. Id. at 405 n.138.
30. Id. at 406 n.141 (citing testimony in Hearings before The Senate
Committee on Finance on H.R. 7225, 84th Congress. 406 (1956) at 547, where Dr.
Edward Stieglitz testified: "Apparently there has been great difficulty in attempting
to define disability.. .The question is: When [is] a man disabled or when is a
woman disabled? Fundamentally, it is when the individual quits trying").
31. Id. at n.141, 145-47. As noted by the Social Security Advisory Council in
1948, "the 'strict test of long-term attachment to the labor force' would provide
convincing proof of both the ability to work and the ability to earn income over a
substantial period of time," S. Doc. No. 80-162, at 1 (1948).
32. Erkulwater, supra note 19, at 411-12. As more fully set out in the
Erkulwater article, this accelerated review process not only resulted in the
suspension of the review process but the significant reduction in the capacity of the
Social Security Administration to conduct further reviews.
Incentives Act of 1999,3 3 a program that has been equally dismal in
its results. 34 When looked at in the context of the origins of the SSD
program from which the definition of "disability" and the process
used to determine its existence in both programs is drawn, the
problem created by the definition and determination process is not
hard to recognize. Younger individuals with more transitory medical
or psychological impairments are necessarily more likely to recover
some form of functionality, either through treatment, training, or
changes in habit that may enable them to return to some form of
gainful employment. The "early retirement" disability program
created in 1956 contained no provision for assessing return to work
capabilities and thus ignored that potential. As the GAO reported in
2001, private insurers and European countries routinely assess and
provide vocational rehabilitation services to individuals in their
disability programs at an early stage in the process, 35 but the SSA has
no provision for assessment, medical, or vocational rehabilitation
services until after a claimant has already proved his disability.
36
Once beneficiaries are already on long-term disability rolls, even
private insurers report that only 2-3% either returned to work or were
removed from their rolls due to a determination that they had the
capacity to work. 37 The procedure adopted by the creators of the
SSD program, because it was based on the "early retirement"
paradigm, made no provision for reviews. The SSA procedure for
conducting continuing disability reviews finally adopted was
generally limited to actual medical improvement, provided no
mandatory rehabilitation requirement, and was subject to numerous
technical hurdles.
38
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13206-13219 (2004).
34. See Bruce S. Growick & Judith L. Drew, The Ticket to Work: The
Unintended Consequences of an Imperfect Law, 6 J. OF FORENSIC VOCATIONAL
ANALYSIS 49 (2003). As of March 2003, 2.3 million "Tickets" had been issued
and only 13,511 had been assigned, less than 3/4 of 1%. This is similar to the 1/2 of
1% of workers whose benefits were terminated based upon a successful return to
work. Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program, 2002, August, 2003: Social Security Administration, Table 49.
35. GAO Report 01-153, supra note 25, at 14-24.
36. Id. at 23.
37. Id. at 13.
38. See 20 CFR § 404.1530(a) (2004); see also Shramak v. Apfel, 226 F.3d
809 (7th Cir. 2000) (where an ALJ was reversed when she terminated benefits due
to the failure of the claimant to quit smoking).
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B. Scientific Advances Confirm Connection Between Disability and
Voluntary Lifestyle Choices
As our country has advanced in fighting infectious diseases and
other acute threats to health, research has turned to the causes of
more chronic illnesses plaguing modem society and upon which a
finding of disability may be based. A publication issued by the
World Health Organization in 2002 noted that at least one-third of
the entire disease burden in the industrialized societies of North
America, Europe, and Asia is caused by tobacco, alcohol, blood
pressure, cholesterol, and obesity.39 A recent study of more than
900,000 women and men concluded that obesity is a significant risk
factor for, in addition to heart disease, cancer generally and for
cancer in several specific body sites. Numerous studies confirm a
correlation between obesity and disability.4 1 The medical literature is
replete with studies confirming the adverse health effects and
42
resulting disability caused by smoking. Diabetes has been
positively linked with obesity and a sedentary lifestyle.43
Equally compelling have been the studies that confirm the
beneficial effect on health outcome from relatively straightforward
lifestyle changes, such as smoking cessation, exercise, and weight
loss. Exercise programs have been effective in dealing with common
disabilities such as low back pain,44  chronic neck pain,
45
39. World Health Report 2002, World Health Organization: Geneva,
Switzerland, 2003, 8 available at http://www.who.int/whr/2002/en/whroz.en.pdf
(last visited March 12, 2005).
40. Eugenia E. Calle, et al., Overweight, Obesity and Mortality from Cancer
in a Prospectively Studied Cohort of U.S. Adults, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED., 1625-28
(2003).
41. Evette Weil, et al., Obesity Among Adults with Disabling Conditions, 288
JAMA 1265-68 (2002).
42. Centers for Disease Control, Annual Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years
of Potential Life Lost and Economic Costs, 1995-99, 51 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, 300-04 (April 12, 2002).
43. Claire M. Steppan, et al., The Hormone Resistin Links Obesity to Diabetes,
409 NATURE, 307-12 (2001).
44. Matthew W. Lively, A Sports Medicine Approach to Low Back Pain, 95
SOUTHERN MED. J., 642-45 (2002). At the time that this paper was written, a local
television station was running a story on a health care practitioner who claimed to
have a ninety percent success rate in the reduction of elimination of often crippling
back pain through use of exercise based on martial arts principles. See
fibromyalgia,46 and other ailments. Regular physical exercise has
been shown to be one of the most effective treatments for many
forms of mental illness47 and may even increase mental alertness and
48
engagement. Smoking cessation is cited by the Surgeon General as
a major factor in reducing disability.49
These advances in scientific knowledge of the causes of common
disabilities and the nature of the treatment which serves to improve
health outcomes has a profound impact on the basis of our current
disability programs. The foundation of our disability benefit system
is the principle that there are some people who, despite their own best
efforts, are physically unable to hold a job. But the foregoing
literature casts considerable doubt on this underlying assumption.
Based upon emerging scientific knowledge as to the causes and
treatment of many common disabling conditions, the disabled
individuals in many cases have much more control over the progress
of their conditions through the adoption of many simple (I did not say
easy) healthy lifestyle choices, such as smoking cessation, weight
loss, and exercise.
Let me clarify a point here. There are many conditions of genetic
origin; others caused by accidents or environmental conditions which
are considered "out of the control" of the individual; still others of
unknown etiology and some which are clearly the result of adverse
"lifestyle" choices such as smoking, drug and alcohol use, a
Sylvia Perez, Kicking Back Pain, ABC7, at
http://abclocal.go.conwls/news/specialsegments/1 12603.ss.backpain.html (last
viewed Nov. 29, 2003).
45. Roni Evans, et al., Two Year Follow-up of a Randomized Clinical Trial of
Spinal Manipulation and Two Types of Exercise for Patients with Chronic Neck
Pain, 27 SPINE 2383-89 (2002).
46. Wingers, et al, Effects of Aerobic Exercise Versus Stress Management
Treatment in Fibromyalgia A 4.5 year Prospective Study, 25 SCAND. J. OF
RHEUMATOLOGY, 77-86 (1996); see also Nutting, et al, An Exercise Program in the
Treatment of Fibromyalgia, 23 J. OF RHEUMATOLOGY, 1050-53 (1996).
47. Daniel M. Landers, The Influence of Exercise on Mental Health, PCPFS
RESEACH DIGEST, Vol. 2, No. 12 (1998); see also D.A. Lawler& S.W. Hopkner,
The Effectiveness of Exercise as an Intervention in the Management of Depression,
322 BMJ 1, 1-8 (2001).
48. Exercise Gets Blood to Your Brain, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2003).
49. Report of the Surgeon General, Reducing Tobacco Use, U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (2000), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr_--2000/fullreport.pdf.
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sedentary lifestyle, and poor diet. The scientific knowledge
confirming links between many disabling conditions and voluntary
"lifestyle" choices affects SSD and SSI disability benefit programs in
two distinct ways. First, it tends to erode support for benefits that are
not time-limited or otherwise qualified so as to discourage
"voluntary" behavior that might qualify for benefits (in the same way
that support for the ADC program was eroded due to the perception
that unsupported pregnancies and children were "voluntary" choices
of the individuals involved). 50 This is not to say that the disability
benefit program did not in the past award disability benefits to many
persons who, like the motorcycle driver who suffered a traumatic
brain injury because he was not wearing a helmet, were certainly
responsible for their own disabling condition. But as the attitudes
about common "disabilities" such as diabetes, respiratory
impairments, and obesity change, support for unqualified assistance
through a guaranteed benefit program of cash and other benefits may
tend to erode. Second, the scientific knowledge as to effective
treatment of such conditions, and the control the "disabled" person
has over the progress of his or her condition, tends to encourage the
principle of "mitigation" of the disabling condition to the extent
"reasonable"51 under the circumstances. I will discuss in more detail
in Section HI the theoretical implications of advances in scientific
knowledge on disability benefit programs and in Section IV try to
integrate these advances into suggested modifications in the disability
benefit programs.
C. Political and Legal Changes
The most significant piece of legislation with respect to persons
with real or perceived disabilities was the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990.52 Hailed by supporters as "the 20th Century
50. See Amy Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, 8 VA. J. OF SOC. POL'Y &
L. 477, 496 ("The long turning of the tide away from willingness to support single
parents goes hand-in-hand with a growing consensus that the decision whether or
not to become a mother is increasingly under the individual's control. Birth control
and abortion have become safer, increasingly available, and more reliable.").
51. Id. at 493.
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2005).
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Emancipation Proclamation for all persons with disabilities," 53 the
law prohibited discrimination against persons with disabilities and
provided access to those persons in a wide range of public activities,
including employment. One of the most litigated of the employment
provisions required employers to provide "reasonable
accommodations" in order to employ persons with disabilities."
54
While there has been a great deal of litigation and resultant
commentary on the rather restrictive view of the U.S. Supreme Court
and lower courts in interpreting the scope of the employment
provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Bagenstos makes a
persuasive argument that these restrictive interpretations are largely
supported by the arguments made by proponents of the Act as a
welfare reform statute for the disabled. Bagenstos traces the origins
of the disability rights movement which culminated in the passage of
the Americans with Disabilities Act to the Independent Living
Movement of the early 1970s, a movement which specifically
eschewed dependence on charity or disability benefits in favor of
personal responsibility, independence, and the "dignity of risk., 56 To
the intellectuals involved in this movement, it was important for the
individual with a disability to depend on his or her own industry
rather than on the welfare state.57 These arguments dovetailed neatly
with the conservative bent of the 1980s and early 1990s. The
National Council on the Handicapped in its 1986 report, Toward
Independence,58 advocated a new federal law, perhaps titled "The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1986," which would prohibit
discrimination against the handicapped in a "clear, consistent and
enforceable" 59 manner and argued that the $60 billion annual federal
spending on disability benefits and programs could be spent "more
prudently and productively." 60 In a hearing before a SenateSubcommittee considering the ADA, disability analyst Edward
53. Dissonant, supra note 5, at n.5 (citing Statement of Senator Harkin, chief
sponsor of the bill, 136 Congressional Record S9689 (daily ed. July 13, 1990)).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).
55. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare
Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921 (2003).
56. Id. at n.327, 329.
57. Id. (referring to quotations from Nosek Tarita, the Darts and DeJong).
58. National Council on Disability, Toward Independence (1996).
59. Id. at 18.
60. Id. at vi.
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Berkowitz estimated the cost of U.S. public and private disability
programs at $170 billion per year. 61 As most succinctly stated in a
published letter to the editor of the Wall Street Journal by then
Attorney General Dick Thornburgh in 1989:
For too long federal policy has provided massive
financial resources for income support programs to
maintain individuals with disabilities in a state of
dependency. The new legislation, on the other hand,
will promote the independence of people with
disabilities to enable them to enter into the mainstream
of American Life. By removing barriers to full
participation by disabled individuals, the bill will have
direct and tangible benefits to the economy. The result
will be more disabled people working, increased
earnings, less dependence on the Social Security
system, increased spending on consumer goods and
increased tax revenue.
62
Indeed, Berkowitz argued persuasively that SSD and SSIs should
be reformed to incorporate the work inducements of the ADA." The
subsequent restrictive interpretations in the courts' decisions defining
a "qualified" person with a disability, especially the requirement that
mitigating measures be used in considering whether there is a
disability, 64 and use of judicial estoppel to prohibit a person from
both seeking accommodation as a person capable of performing the
"essential functions" of a job65 and seeking disability benefits based
upon the contention that "he is.. .unable... to engage in any.. .kind of
61. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 933 before the
Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate Committee of Labor and Human
Resources, 101 st Cong. 370-74 (1989).
62. Bagenstos, supra note 55, at 972-73 (quoting Dick Thornburgh, Toward
Independence for the Disabled, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 6, 1989, at A 13).
63. Entitlement, supra note 16.
64. See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that a pilot
whose eyeglasses corrected her vision to 20/20 from 20/200 and 20/400 was not "a
person with a disability" as defined by the ADA); see also Murphy v. United Parcel
Service, 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (holding that hypertension that was controlled with
medication was likewise not a "disability" under the ADA).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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substantial gainful work,"66 seem consistent with a policy that ADA
protections should be accorded only those actively seeking work who
might not otherwise be employable without accommodation. In other
words, the linkage between the ADA and reduction in disability
benefit program rolls is apparent in the arguments made for the
passage of the ADA and implicit in the court interpretations of that
Act subsequent to its passage. Since the ADA plaintiffs in Sutton and
related cases were qualified for many other jobs in the national
economy, they would not be "disabled" under the definition of the
SSD and SSI disability benefit criteria. Similarly, although in
Cleveland the court distinguished between the conflicting definitions
of "disability" contained in the ADA and the SSD and SSI disability
benefit programs, it is clear that courts may consider a claimant's
contentions in a filing for disability benefits and his or her
contentions in an ADA claim as, in some cases, mutually
inconsistent.
A second legal development that has eroded the underpinnings of
the current disability income program was the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996,67 which
eliminated the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program in favor of a more limited program (Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families-TANF) which required self-sufficiency attempts
and limited lifetime benefits to at most five years. An important part
of this program was a mandatory work requirement that the
individual States would have to implement through vocational or
other work programs. 68 While it is probably too early to judge the
total impact of the program on poverty among single parents, the law
has reduced caseloads markedly. 69 In her article, A Reciprocal
66. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(a) (2004). Bagenstos argues that despite the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt Sys., 526 U.S. 795 (1999),
courts routinely grant summary judgment to defendants in ADA cases where any
statement of the ADA plaintiff in an SSD claim is incompatible with the contention
that the individual is "qualified" to do the job for which accommodation was
requested.
67. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
68. See Dan Bloom, After AFDC: Welfare to Work Choices and Challenges for
States (1997).
69. Tim Jones, Welfare Reform Fails to End Poverty, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept.
30, 2003 at 9 (discussing the experience of Wisconsin, which saw a decline of
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Welfare Program,70 Amy Wax examines the changing social
attitudes regarding women and particularly single mothers in the
workplace and concludes that these changes inevitably resulted in
uneasiness with "allowing some mothers to depend almost entirely
on public support while others with similar attributes succeed in
maintaining greater independence." 7' Another factor in the erosion
of public support for the AFDC program was the increasing
consensus that reproductive decisions ultimately represented the
conscious choice of the prospective mother. These factors
undermined the idea of continued public support for mothers with
dependent children based upon the doctrine of reciprocity. Wax
asserts that all social arrangements are ultimately based on
reciprocity, which leads to the imposition of a doctrine that "persons
should strive for self-sufficiency if the effort required is within the
realm of reason, with the standard of reasonable exertion informed by
the conventional expectations and by what most people do." 72 While
the initial disability program incorporated the concept of
''reciprocity" in its disability "insurance" program by means of
mandatory deductions from a worker's paycheck to cover the
eventuality of an unforeseen "disability" before retirement, as
discussed above, the expansion of the national disability programs to
include non-workers under SSI and younger individuals with
disabilities that might be amenable to rehabilitation has changed the
system in a way that perhaps requires a revision in the "reciprocity"
paradigm. As Wax points out in her subsequent article Disability,
Reciprocity and "Real Efficiency": A Unified Approach:
It is hard to see why persons with conventional
disabilities should ever be categorically excused from
expending the reasonable work effort that we
routinely expect from persons who have difficulties on
the job market for other reasons. Persons whose
paucity of marketable skills prevent them from
obtaining jobs that pay enough to support themselves
80% in its caseload over the last decade under the aggressive Wisconsin Works
(W-2) program but still noted considerable poverty in a core of poor people).
70. Wax, supra note 50, at 477.
71. Id. at 495.
72. Id. at 493.
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or their families, regardless of the cause of the deficit,
are nonetheless expected to work. This expectation
suggests that we should jettison the notion that having
a medical disability excuses nonwork altogether.73
It is certainly possible that changing attitudes about the possible
productivity of disabled individuals, induced in part by the rhetoric of
the ADA supporters and their repeated use of successfully productive
examples of disabled individuals, together with the experience of
declining caseloads of former AFDC recipients under the mandatory
work requirements of TANF, may lead to public support for
mandatory vocational evaluations and work referrals for disability
applicants and recipients.
At about the same time as it was restructuring the AFDC welfare
program, Congress was acting to restrict government benefits to
disabled SSD or SSI recipients in another area of individual "choice":
alcohol and drug addiction. Due to judicial decisions and the general
medical consensus that drug addiction and alcoholism (DA&A) were
"diseases" in their own right, the Social Security Administration had
recognized these as medically determinable impairments which could
warrant a finding of disability benefits independently of any mental
or physical impairments (such as liver damage or dementia) that
might result from the chronic use of such intoxicants. 74 Recovery for
this disability was severely restricted in 1994,75 limiting benefits to
three years and requiring that disabled addicts seek treatment for their
addictions. In 1996, payments to SSD and SSI beneficiaries due to
DA&A were cut off completely.76 Thus, for a two-year period
between 1994-1996, these programs required addicts and alcoholics
to actively seek treatment for their "disabilities" and granted time-
limited benefits and targeted medical treatment to these individuals in
order to foster their rehabilitation. The sudden cutoff of these benefits
was unfortunate in that it did not allow for the complete
implementation of the program and evaluation of the efficacy of the
imposition of positive health choices on the part of disability
73. Amy L. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity and "Real Efficiency ". A Unified
Approach, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1421, 1446-47 (2003).
74. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt P, App. A (1985).
75. Pub. L. No. 103-296 (1994).
76. Pub. L. 104-121 (1996).
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beneficiaries. In fact, studies confirmed that the cutoff resulted in
many addicts "dropping out" of treatment, losing their housing,
committing suicide or turning to crime, and very few returned to
gainful employment. 77 The negative results from this cutoff suggest
that a punitive approach based upon restricting social disability
benefits under SSI and SSD based upon the unhealthy or unwise past
"lifestyle" choices of the applicant/recipient may not be effective. A
non-punitive approach would seem to be the politically-accepted goal
incorporated in the TANF program, where mothers with dependent
children are not penalized for their (perhaps) unwise past choices but
are instead given support conditioned on reasonably-required work
effort.78
Another statutory development that reflects on the goals of our
current disability income programs is the Ticket to Work and Work
Incentives Improvement Act of 1999.79 This law addressed concerns
regarding loss of medical coverage by those coming off disability
rolls, and allowed for the purchase of Medicaid coverage by certain
low-income disabled workers and the extension of Medicare benefits
for up to five years after a disabled individual comes off of SSD
benefits due to employment. The cornerstone of the program was the
provision of "tickets" to disabled beneficiaries which allowed them,
at their option, to obtain free vocational rehabilitation and assistance
services to be paid for by the federal government based upon the
savings to the disability system accruing from the now-employed
beneficiary. The program was developed in response to continued
prodding of the SSA by the GAO to implement a comprehensive
vocational rehabilitation policy in its disability programs.'s While it
is again very early in the program implementation period, initial
results of the program are not encouraging, 81 and a recent GAO
report urged more fundamental policy changes in the system to
address return-to-work goals.
82
77. Dru Stevenson, Should Addicts Get Welfare? Addiction & SSI/SSD, 68
BROOKLYN L. REV. 185, 196-202 (2000).
78. Wax, supra note 50, at 497.
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13206-13219 (2005).
80. See GAO/HEHS 96-133, July 11, 1996; see also SSA Disability Program
Redesign Necessary to Encourage Return to Work (GAO/HEHS 96-62, April 24,
1996).
81. Growick & Drew, supra note 34, at 53.
82. GAO Report 01-153, supra note 25, at 39.
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IV. CURRENT SITUATION OF THE DISABLED AND EMERGING VIEWS OF
THE DISABLED IN SOCIETY
Estimates from the United States Census indicate that in 1990,
48.9 million Americans aged 21 to 64 (19.4%) had a disability and
that number had increased to 53 million in 1997.83 About one-half of
those individuals had "severe" disabilities, or those generally
requiring assistance with daily activities, using an assistive walking
device or qualifying for federal disability programs based upon
inability to work.84 The unemployment rate for those with severe
disabilities is about 70%, with the unemployment rate for non-
severely disabled at 18%.85 The poverty level for people with
disabilities is high (27.9%) and their level of home ownership is
extremely low (less than 10%). 86 Of the people with disabilities who
are not working, 72% said in a widely reported 1998 Louis Harris
poll, that they would like to work.87 There have been a number of
statutory attempts to spur employment among the disabled, including
the ADA, the Ticket to Work program and the various work incentive
88programs in SSD and SSI systems, such as the trial work period, the
extended eligibility period89 and certain earned income retention
benefits under SSI.9° But studies assessing the impact of the ADA
have been equivocal at best, and any exodus from the disability rolls
envisioned by the above reforms has certainly not materialized. For
example, only 0.5% of all social security disability beneficiaries
leave the disability rolls because of a successful return to work9' and
less than 0.75% of the "tickets" under the federal Ticket to Work
program have been assigned as of March 2003.
92
83. Rich, et al, Critical Legal and Policy Issues for People with Disabilities, 6
DEPAUL J. OF HEALTH CARE LAW 1, 6 (2002).
84. Id. at 4 (referring to definition of disability items in Census, 2000).
85. Id.at 7-8 (citing census statistics from 1997).
86. Id.
87. See Great Lakes Disability & Business Assistance Center, Harris Poll
Results, Region V News, Spring/Summer, 1998, at 1.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 422(c)(4)(A) (West 2005).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 423(e)(1) (West 2005).
90.42 U.S.C. § 1382a(3)(A).
91. ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY DIsABILrY
INSURANCE PROGRAM, 2002, Table 49 (released August 2003), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di-asr/2OO2/exp-toc.html.
92. Growick & Drew, supra note 34, at 53.
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In his historical survey of the relationship of the disabled to our
society as a whole, Weber points out that early policy was based
upon the concept of custodialism.
93
"Custodialism is the idea that persons with disabilities are to be
sheltered - that they should be kept separate from the population at
large and given charity to compensate for their inability to survive on
their own." 94 Weber points to laws such as the Chicago ordinance
prohibiting persons who were "deformed" or "unsightly" from
exposing themselves in public or forced sterilizations of feeble-
minded women based upon the pseudo-science of Eugenics as
examples of policies of custodialism. 95 The emphasis of custodialism
was on the fundamental differences existing between the disabled
and nondisabled person and not on their fundamental equality.96 The
principles underlying our current disability benefits systems, such as
the division of applicants into "disabled" and "nondisabled" persons,
the segregation of "disabled" persons from the work force and
provision of generally unconditional income support payments to
those found to be "disabled" seem to draw on the ideas underlying
custodialism.
As noted in the previous discussion on the ADA, this act was
formulated and passed, in part, by the very aggressive reaction of
many disabled people to the paternalistic attitude embodied by
custodialism. This new policy was termed integrationism, and
emphasized the voluntary and compulsory application of technology,
along with attitudinal and environmental changes compelled by
antidiscrimination laws, in fully integrating the disabled as equals
into our society. As noted by Weber, the ADA is a classic
integrationist statute, prohibiting discrimination in employment
(including "reasonable" accommodations for qualified disabled
workers) and mandating alteration of public buildings, transportation,
telecommunication and other services to promote accessibility by
persons with disabilities. 97 Weber points out, however, there are
inherent limitations in the integrationist perspective. Because the
93. Mark Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist
Examination, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 889 (2000).
94. Id. at 889.
95. Id. at 900-01.
96. Id. 899-900, n.69.
97. Id. at 903-04.
rights embodied in the ADA are subject to interpretation by courts
and agencies, they may be significantly limited or withdrawn at the
will of the majority (nondisabled). Unconscious discrimination and
stereotypes might cloud an employer's decision. Many disabled
persons may be hesitant to seek enforcement of rights through legal
remedies. Limits of "reasonableness" in accommodation could be
applied restrictively so as to discourage employment or major
construction alterations. More fundamentally, the person with a
disability is generally not as productive as a non-disabled worker, all
other things being equal, and thus there is a disincentive on the part
of any employer to hire such a worker, whether or not an
accommodation is required.98  To make up for the fundamental
differences in productivity between disabled and nondisabled
persons, Weber argues that affirmative actions must be taken by
society through mandatory income redistribution and/or job set-
asides to "equalize" the condition of the disabled. 99 He termed this
doctrine "post-integrationism."
' 00
The post-integrationist approach was most recently discussed in
the context of reciprocity in Wax's article on disability. 10' According
to Wax, a just society is based upon what John Rawls terms the
reciprocal cooperation among equals. 102 In practical application, this
would involve in Wax's view reciprocal obligations on the part of the
individual to exercise reasonable efforts at self-sufficiency 103 in
return for a government guarantee of a basic standard of living.
104
With respect to the disabled, this would involve the reinterpretation
of social benefit programs so as to incorporate the obligation to
exercise good-faith "reasonable" efforts at self-supporting work in
return for a public subsidy to "make up the difference."' 10 5  Wax
suggests that this duty to work might necessitate more aggressive
98. Id. at 905-06.
99. Weber, supra note 93, at 917. See also Mark Weber, Beyond the
Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment Policy for People with
Disabilities, 46 BuFF. L. REv. 123 (1998).
100. Weber, supra note 93, at 913-14.
101. Wax, supra note 73, at 1446-48.
102. Wax, supra note 50 (referencing Rex Martin, Rawls's New Theory of
Justice, 69 CHI-KENT L. REv. 737, 750-51 (1994)).
103. Wax, supra note 50, at 493.
104. Id. at 496.
105. Wax, supra note 73, at 1446-48.
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efforts on the part of society to accommodate the disabled worker in
many cases, even if the burden on the employer is economically
unreasonable, as in most cases the economic burden placed on the
employer through accommodation and/or productivity differential
will be more than offset by the savings to society in general in the
form of unpaid disability benefits. Among her recommendations for
disability benefit programs is that they move away from the bright
line "all or nothing" disability approach and that there be a renewed
emphasis on rehabilitation, vocational counseling, and job placement
for the disabled. 106
The GAO Report discussed earlier examined aspects of various
private insurance disability programs and public programs in three
European countries,10 7 and noted significant changes between their
systems and that in the SSD/SSI system. Most significantly, all of the
disability systems used by private insurers and in the European
countries incorporated return-to-work evaluation and enhancement in
their initial disability determination process. 10 8 For example, each of
the private insurers made an initial determination as to whether the
disability applicant was able to return to his prior work and, if not, a
determination of the applicant's remaining work potential.'0 9 If the
insurer determined that the applicant had work potential, the insurer
then developed and implemented an individualized return to work
strategy. 110 With the applicants that were deemed without
rehabilitation, potential a much less aggressive and costly monitoring
procedure was set up to handle the claim."' All three private
insurers incorporated varying definitions for "disability" during the
different stages of the evaluation process: more liberal at the
beginning and becoming progressively more restrictive for a period
of usually two years."12 The private insurers involved required the
disabled person's participation in vocational rehabilitation at the cost
106. Id. at 1450.
107. The insurers involved were UNUMProvident, Hartford Life and CIGNA,
and the European Countries were Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. GAO
Report 01-153, supra note 25, at 5.
108. ld. at 14.
109. Id. at 18.
110. Id. at 16, Figure 1.
111. Id. at 35-36.
112. Id. at 15, 18.
of the loss of benefits" 3 and offered monetary incentives, including
the ability to earn substantial sums and retain disability benefits 14 to
their beneficiaries. All of the insurers involved both required and
assisted in providing appropriate medical treatment to mitigate the
claimant's disability. " Similarly, the European governments
involved emphasized an early return to work evaluation, provision of
medical and vocational assistance, and the denial of benefits to
claimants who refuse to engage in vocational rehabilitation,
116
although the availability of universal health benefits and the
imposition of significant duties on private employers make exact
comparison with the SSD/SSI program impossible.
While the history of past SSA disability return to work initiatives
is not encouraging, the current Commissioner has embarked on a far-
reaching overhaul of the disability determination process." 17  A
number of new demonstration projects are planned, all of which tend
to address shortcomings of the current work incentives program in
the disability benefit programs. 18 The first project is a type of
"temporary allowance" which may be made in serious cases where an
individual's condition is expected to improve if support and
rehabilitation are given sooner in the process rather than later.
11 9
Expert reviewers would screen the cases and individuals would be
allowed cash benefits and medical coverage for twelve, eighteen, or
twenty-four months. It is hoped that during this time they will
113. Id. at 25-26.
114. Id. at26.
115. Id. at27.
116. Id. at28.
117. Hearing on the Social Security Administration's Management of the
Office of Hearings and Appeals Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Jo Ann B. Barnhart, Commissioner, Social
Security Administration). The "record" of an SSD/SSI claims file is the total paper
record of the disability application, work history and other documents filled out by
the claimant together with all of the medical records obtained by the state DDS in
investigating and evaluating the claim. It should be noted that the timing of the
electronic file implementation coincides with the implementing of the requirement
for conversion to electronic medical records in the private sector.
118. Robert Isbell, Summary of Comments Made by Commissioner Barnhart
and Deputy Commissioner Gerry to Advocacy and Professional Groups, Sept. 26,
2003 in Washington, D.C.. See also GAO Report 01-153, supra note 25, at 30-31.
119. Commissioner Barnhart, Testimony Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, supra note 117.
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improve and return to work. After this time the individuals will be
reviewed and, if they have not returned to work, they will go through
the regular disability procedure.
The second pilot project is an early intervention project designed
by Monroe Berkowitz from Rutgers University. 120 This program
targets beneficiaries who have not yet had any determination as to
their entitlement to benefits made by the Social Security
Administration. Under this program, the Social Security
Administration would screen initial applicants for both their
likelihood of receiving benefits and their reasonable expectation for
success in a return to work program. 121 If the applicant passes both
these screens, he or she is given a choice as to whether to proceed
with the disability application in the normal manner or volunteer to
participate in a return to work program. If they choose the return to
work option, the program is designed to offer various incentives
based upon various models Certain of the early intervention
initiatives contemplate that temporary benefits would paid, medical
services provided, or vocational services would be offered by private
or public vocational agencies. 122 Providers (who may be vocational
experts or even attorneys) could be compensated on a contingent
basis by as much as 50% of the money saved by the trust fund on a
successful return to work.123 A third pilot program would involve the
provision of temporary medical benefits to those from whom medical
improvement might be expected with proper care but have no health
insurance, and a fourth program would involve a benefit offset
provision in the SSD program which would allow an individual to
draw reduced benefits if earning over the SGA amount (currently
$800/month). There is also a proposal for giving ongoing health
benefits to those individuals, like HIV positive individuals and those
suffering from mood disorders, who need extensive medication in
order to be employed and now must rely on indigency-based
120. Monroe Berkowitz, John Burton, and Debra Brucker, Designing an Early
Intervention Experiment and Demonstration Approach for The Social Security
Administration, Program for Disability Research, Early Intervention Project at
www.disabilityresearch.rutgers.edu/eiproject.htm (last checked 5/10/05).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
Medicaid. '24
V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE IN THE DISABILITY BENEFITS SYSTEM
There have been many suggestions as to how to attain a more
reasonable, compassionate and consistent social disability policy in
this country, and this article will not summarize them all here. But
when looked at through the lens of historical development, our SSD
and SSI disability benefit programs suffer from one glaring flaw: the
perceived finality of the determination of disability. The length of
time it takes to obtain such a determination, the formality of its
pronouncement (through an Administrative Law Judge after
consultation with medical and vocational experts, if necessary), the
statutory definition of recognized disability in the context of a
"permanent" and later long-term event, and the view that both SSD
and SSI are earned "benefits" accruing to an individual because of
the limitations caused by his or her health condition, all emphasize
both the permanency of the beneficiary's condition and the
desirability of maintaining such status. When combined with the lack
of any return to work program employed at any stage prior to a final
determination, the programs almost ensure that the hard-won status
of being "disabled" will not be voluntarily surrendered. And that
designation certainly has its rewards. As Diller correctly notes, even
in very conservative cost-conscious times when other welfare
programs were being slashed, reengineered and returned to the states,
the disability programs have been tinkered with only on the
fringes. 125 But the advances of modem medicine have both extended
the age of useful work life and minimized the effects of acute
disabling events. 126 In today's world, a disability claimant is quite
possibly a younger individual with a chronic back, circulatory, or
diabetic condition that might be improved through proper medical
treatment and significant lifestyle changes, including smoking
cessation, diet and exercise. In this context, the rationale underlying
124. Isbell, supra note 118.
125. Entitlement, supra note 16, at 448. Congress has limited benefits in
children's SSI cases. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat 2105 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
126. See GAO Report 02-597, supra note 1, at 13-14.
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our disability benefit systems, that of "early retirement" because of a
"permanent" condition, is no longer fully warranted. 127 Instead, it
might be better to re-conceive the SSD/SSI disability benefit
programs as a means of providing transitional support during a period
of retraining and rehabilitation, rather than as a source of long-term
income support. This would involve the recognition and the
expectation that, to at least some extent, disabled people are in charge
of both their own condition and their future, and a return or entry into
the economic mainstream of life is to be expected of all but the most
functionally incapacitated. This expectation is in accord with the
policies of the private disability insurers studied by the GAO and
European countries, as well as well within the moral parameters of
the reciprocity doctrine set out above. As noted by Dr. Edward
Stieglitz in the initial hearings on the disability program, a person
becomes disabled "when an individual quits trying."'128 The current
system discourages "trying," because of a number of factors that
have been discussed previously. The list of "reforms" that have been
made in the program in recent years catalogue efforts to remove
impediments to "trying", such as penalties in medical insurance
benefits or arbitrary loss of benefits by means of temporary and
unsustained work. But the underlying assumptions of the program
remain undisturbed, and it is these that must be systemically altered.
Certainly medical care is essential for most persons with
disabilities, and they should not be penalized through the loss of
government-paid medical care by a return to work. I would propose
that Medicaid be provided to all uninsured applicants who meet the
requirements for vocational services under the federal-state
vocational rehabilitation program. These services are already
arguably provided to any individual with a disability who needs
vocational services and who requires medical care to become
employable under section 103(6)(A)-(F) of the Rehabilitation Act,' 29
127. Dissonant, supra note 5, at 1067.
128. See Entitlement, supra note 16, at n. 141.
129. Section 103(a)(6) of the Rehabilitation Act as amended provides that the
following services can be provided by the Vocational Rehabilitation Service:
to the extent that financial support is not readily available from a
source (such as through health insurance of the individual or
through comparable services and benefits consistent with section
721(a)(8)(A) of this title, other than the designated State unit,
diagnosis and treatment of physical and mental impairments,
although this must be provided as part of a comprehensive
individualized employment plan overseen by the state vocational
rehabilitation agency. 130 I propose that the only precondition for the
provision of such medical care is that the individual be looking for or
preparing for work. Once employed, the individual would continue to
qualify for any uninsured medical care necessary to maintain
employment.
The argument might arise that this particular proposal may create
an incentive on the part of a person with a disability to quit his or her
current job and apply for medical coverage and vocational services
while looking for work. But our current system creates its own
disincentives to work in order to obtain medical care, and the same
such incentives might and do encourage uninsured workers to reduce
earnings in order to qualify for Medicaid. At least this proposal
would encourage a return to and maintenance of paid employment,
with resulting payment of taxes and reduction of dependence on the
part of the person with a disability. With respect to vocational
rehabilitation services, I propose that all current and prospective
applicants for SSD and SSI benefits, except those screened out by the
SSA as clearly unemployable, should be referred to a vocational
rehabilitation counselor prior to any hearing as to disability status by
an Administrative Law Judge. The investigation and initial
determination(s) by the state disability determination services can
proceed at the same time as any vocational services which are
provided to the applicant, and an award of disability benefits could
including -
(A) corrective surgery or therapeutic treatment necessary to
correct or substantially modify a physical or mental condition
that constitutes a substantial impediment to employment, but is of
such a nature that such correction may reasonably be expected to
eliminate or reduce such impediment to employment within a
reasonable length of time; (B) necessary hospitalization in
connection with surgery or treatment; (C) prosthetic and orthotic
devices; (D) eyeglasses and visual services as prescribed by
qualified personnel who meet State licensure laws and who are
selected by the individual; (E) special services (including
transplantation and dialysis), artificial kidneys, and supplies
necessary for treatment of individuals with end-stage renal
disease; (F) diagnosis and treatment of mental and emotional
disorders by qualified personnel who meet State licensure laws.
130. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 102(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 723 (b)(1) (1998).
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not be denied because of temporary employment obtained through a
vocational rehabilitation referral. While the referral provisions were
in the Social Security Act prior to the Ticket to Work amendments,
they apparently were not often used and suffered from a
reimbursement system that created little incentive for success on the
part of the vocational system involved. 131 Vocational counselors
should have access to the relevant medical and vocational data in the
Social Security Disability claim file. 32 The State-Federal VR system
must be changed in such a way as to encourage the providing of
vocational services by alternate (private) providers, including
employment networks (ENs), and the compensation under the Ticket
to Work outcome payment system should be increased and
accelerated in order to attract smaller private providers. The work
incentive provisions relating to SSI earnings should be included in
the SSD system as contemplated in one of the current pilot programs.
It is essential that vocational counselors from private industry are
encouraged to supplement the supply of counselors available in the
state programs, as recent studies have demonstrated significant
delays in providing of services even in the lightly-used Ticket to
Work program.1 33 As Growick correctly points out, the state-federal
VR System can no longer be the sole provider of rehabilitation
services to disabled individuals, and a specific delineation between
the roles of private and public VR providers is sorely needed.
134
Perhaps Weber's suggestion that positive affirmative action in the
form of set-asides or targets in employment for disabled people
135
131. Bruce Growick, The Political Implications of 7TWWIIA, THE
REHABILITATION PROFESSIONAL, Nov.- Dec. 2000, at 31, 32.
132. See Growick & Drew, supra note 34, at 51-52. As Growick notes:
In other indemnity programs in which rehabilitation professionals
are paid to return beneficiaries to work, the insurance company
provides them with access to critical background information
about prospective clients in order to make informed decisions
about employment feasibility. Without access to such
information in the referral process, rehabilitation providers spend
an inordinate amount of time and/or money collecting data to
determine feasibility for services when data is readily available....
Id.
133. GAO Report 02-597, supra note 1 (citing testimony before TTWIA
Advisory Panel Quarterly Meeting).
134. Id. at51.
135. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 99. See
may be required, for this at least mandates a presence that would tend
to both break down prejudice and build up confidence among
disabled individuals and may significantly expand the pool of jobs
available for the disabled. With respect to the feasibility of this
particular proposal, it should be noted that the GAO Report cites
significant government financial assistance and incentives existing in
the European countries studied to encourage the employment of
individuals with disabilities and pay for any accommodations
necessary, as well as legislated mandatory set-asides.' 
36
But the ultimate cornerstone of any disability benefit reform
program must be based upon recognition of both the power and the
obligation of the individual suffering from a disability, to take
necessary action to "mitigate" such disability. In short, I propose that
for an individual to qualify for and continue to qualify for disability,
such person must be willing to adopt certain healthy "lifestyle"
changes known to assist in restoring health and to avail him or herself
of the options available under the Rehabilitation Act for vocational,
educational, and medical care. Smoking cessation, diet counseling, a
reasonable exercise program, and addictions counseling:1 37 all should
be options that may be required of a claimant in certain situations.
In order to implement such a system, it would be necessary to
alter the disability determination process in such a manner as to
expand the range of possible decisions by the Agency. In addition to
a finding of "disabled" or "not disabled," there should be a third
category that could be found in disability applicants, that of
"temporarily disabled." This category would encompass most
younger individuals (and perhaps some older individuals with less
serious impairments) whom the fact finder determines could benefit
from proper medical care, vocational counseling and healthy lifestyle
choices. The one-year duration requirement for these individuals
would be waived, and cash benefits could be provided for a limited
also Wax, supra note 73 (arguing that efficiency must be evaluated to the economy
as a whole rather than to the individual employer, that is, savings in the form of
unpaid disability income benefits must be factored in when evaluating the
efficiency of a proposed accommodation).
136. GAO Report 01-153, supra note 25, at 28.
137. As noted before, I feel the 1994 amendments in the DA&A disability
category, which mandated addiction treatment and limited benefits resulting from
such impairments to three years, was a prudent alternative which has never really
been implemented.
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time, as well as medical care, vocational counseling, and educational
services. As part of an award of temporary disability benefits, certain
healthy lifestyle changes, such as smoking cessation, diet and
addiction counseling, and a regular exercise program, in accordance
with the recommendations of treating or consulting physicians or
agency examiners, could be required of the claimant. In the event of a
disagreement between the treating and agency physicians concerning
the propriety of a lifestyle change only a well-supported opinion by
the treating physician that such change would not be in the best
health interests of the claimant would be determinative."' After the
initial temporary benefit period had expired, the applicant who still
sought a finding of permanent disability could proceed with his
application, but the failure of the claimant to cooperate in a
vocational rehabilitation program, comply with medical treatment
recommendations or make recommended lifestyle changes could be
considered as factors in the ultimate determination of permanent
disability.
While the above proposal is very much in line with the practices
of the private disability insurers in administering their own disability
programs, there are arguments that such changes, especially the
liberalization of the definition of "disability" to include "temporarily
disabled" persons, might increase the disability rolls precipitously
and not prove cost-effective. Interestingly enough, insurance
companies providing long-term disability insurance benefits reported
a return to work success rate of 38% for those who used
rehabilitation services, 139 although as noted above only 2-3% of the
long-term disabled ever get off the insurers' disability rolls. A 1995
GAO study of the VA Vocational program noted a similar success
138. See 20 CFR section 404.1527, with respect to the weight accorded the
claimant's treating physician as opposed to agency physicians. There has been
considerable litigation on this subject, and it is likely that the agency would not
choose to interfere or override any recommendations. However, it is hard to see
how such beneficial recommendations such as an exercise program, weight loss,
and smoking cessation could be vetoed by a treating physician, especially in light
of the numerous references to such recommendations often present in treating
physician notes reviewed at the disability hearing.
139. Dissonant, supra note 5, at 1072 n.320 (quoting a 1994 Insurance Survey
reported in National Academy of Social Insurance, REPORT OF DISABILITY POLICY
PANEL, BALANCING SECURITY AND OPPORTUNITY: THE CHALLENGE OF DISABILITY
INCOME POLICY (Jerry L. Manshaw & Virginia P. Reno, eds., 1996)).
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rate (37%) in the state VR programs. This is a further incentive for
early intervention of vocational rehabilitation.
In recognition of the greater functionality of our aging population
and the statutory increase in the retirement age of younger workers,
the Medical-Vocational guidelines would be gradually increased in
tandem with the retirement age applicable to the individual applicant.
In other words, the Grids, which provide for presumptive disability
based upon certain factors, such as age, vocational experience, and
education, would be increased so that the effective age at which a
claimant "crosses the grid" would be increased so that the
"sedentary" work grid guideline was crossed 15 years before
retirement age for every claimant, the "light" grid guideline crossed
at 10 years before retirement age, and so on. Congress has increased
the retirement age but SSA has not adjusted its grids to reflect this
change, and the resulting marginal changes may in the aggregate be
catastrophic to the program, considering the already-anticipated
insolvency of the disability trust fund in 2023.140 Recognizing that
many applicants are suffering from conditions that either clearly
preclude employment or are not reasonably susceptible to lifestyle
changes and aggressive medical and vocational intervention, the
option of a finding of permanent disability in both the initial and
hearing stages of the disability determination process would be
retained for the most severely and/or permanently disabled. This is
similar to the screening of cases by private disability insurers, where
those who offer little vocational potential are placed in a different
and less service-intensive category. To ensure uniformity in
decisions, transferability of skills (often used as a bar to disability in
older individuals who otherwise qualify under the grids) would be
eliminated as a bar to a finding of permanent disability in cases based
upon the Medical-Vocational Guidelines in all but those with skilled
past professional experience. 141
This proposal would recognize the inherent obligation on the part
of every individual to take charge of his or her own future in terms of
medical and vocational outcome. But it also would recognize the
tremendous potential present in those considered by themselves or
others to be "disabled" to contribute to improving their own medical
140. GAO Report 01-153, supra note 25, at 3.
141. See Ken Matheny, Social Security Disability and the Older Worker: A
Proposal for Reform, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 37 (2003).
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condition and contribute economically to our society. It also
recognizes the fact that people suffering from a medical or
psychological disability generally are at a disadvantage educationally
and vocationally in comparison to those who are not suffering from a
disability, and it gives such individuals both the support and the tools
of medical rehabilitation and vocational self-sufficiency.
This proposal would also have the advantage of serving the class
of people who are denied benefits under the current SSD and SSI
systems. Statistics from the Social Security Agency itself indicate
that these individuals, despite being found "not disabled" by health
reasons by the Agency fact finders, nevertheless continue to be
unemployed for perceived health reasons at a rate greater than
50%. 4  Referral to a vocational rehabilitation agency with the
ability to offer medical, vocational and education services would be
helpful to many of these denied applicants.143 The SSA employees,
especially those involved in determination of disability, are also
cognizant of the general disability law and protections afforded to
disabled individuals, and they could at least give some form notice of
the availability of such remedies and the local agencies responsible
for enforcement to all applicants.
I also believe that the SSA is in the best position of any federal
agency to implement a unified disability policy with respect to the
persons suffering from a disability in our country. This agency is the
initial contact point for most people with a disability and is also in
possession of the most information, such as work and education
history, medical records, IQ and psychological testing, and alleged
limitations that would be relevant to a rehabilitation program. The
agency also has a great deal of power to influence applicants in that
the benefits it confers are often urgently needed. Through its use of
medical and vocational experts at many different levels of the
disability determination process, the agency has access to resources
necessary to affect a comprehensive medical and vocational
142. See GAO Report HRD-90-2 (1989), Social Security Disability: Denied
Applicants' Health and Financial Status Compared with Beneficiaries', at 21-22,
available at http://161.203.16.4/d2d+7/140019.pdf.
143. It should be noted that, in addition to containing a broader definition of
disability than in the SSD and SSI regulations, under section 102(a)(B)(2) of the
Rehabilitation Act, as amended, there is a presumption of eligibility of an individual
for services provided under the Act.
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rehabilitation plan for a person who might benefit from this. In
actuality, many of these proposals are similar to the ones at least
arguably suggested by prior GAO reports.
Whether the implementation of these changes will be cost-
effective is another matter. Certainly, implementation of these
changes would hopefully divert a certain percentage of claimants
who would otherwise qualify for disability benefits from the
disability rolls and into gainful, tax-paying employment. But it would
also provide benefits to temporarily disabled persons who might not
otherwise qualify for disability benefits, and put significant strain
through referrals on a publicly funded vocational rehabilitation
system. Under the Rehabilitation Act, however, it is clear that almost
all of the persons referred under this proposal would be eligible for
these services anyway, and the increased utilization of these services
should be viewed as ultimately a net plus for society in general and
the persons with disabilities in particular. The increase in disability
rolls could not ultimately be measured in terms of the net yearly
increase or decrease in benefit payments or beneficiaries. Because the
disability system, like the social security system of which it is a part,
is a pay-as-you-go system, there are tremendous unfunded liabilities
existing with respect to current or future beneficiaries, and any
reduction in permanent (as opposed to current) beneficiaries might be
significant even if only incremental. The GAO study confirmed
significant up-front expenses on the part of the involved disability
insurers still yielded significant savings. The un-funded liabilities
with respect to SSI beneficiaries, which are supported by general
revenue and state funding and are not even arguably supported by the
illusory "trust funds" supposedly maintained in the Social Security
programs, are more obviously dangerous to future workers and
taxpayers. And you must add to the program savings resulting from
the reduction in the rolls of the "permanently" disabled the intangible
benefits to individuals and society as a whole inherent in any medical
and vocational improvements on the part of the prospective disability
applicants.
A determination of temporary disability would give the claimant
the benefit of vocational, medical and educational services that might
return such a claimant to economic and personal independence. If it
did not, the claimant's condition could be reviewed by the decision-
maker through the prism of the experience over the temporary
disability period. For example, if the claimant was placed at a
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sedentary occupation and could not successfully continue such work
on a day-to-day basis, this could be considered evidence that the
individual was permanently disabled from any occupation. There are
clearly many claimants whose condition will not allow them to work
full-time at any occupation and many others whose condition will
deteriorate over the temporary disability period. However, if the
claimant's main disabling condition was largely exacerbated by
obesity and shortness of breath and the claimant refused to comply
with recommendations for diet counseling, exercise, or smoking
cessation a decision-maker might consider this fact, with certain
limitations, in denying a permanent disability application. The
requirement of healthy lifestyle changes on the part of the claimant
does no disservice to the claimant, as it can only help him in
improving his own health and functionality. Of course, this additional
factor in the ultimate finding of disability could be applied
punitively, but that is a possibility for any additional factor to be
considered by the decision-maker in the disability program; the
principle of liberal construction of the Act, and the independence of
the AU decision on the issue of disability, give considerable
protection to the claimant in this regard.
VI. SOME PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS
As an ALJ, I can really not overemphasize the discouragement
and hopelessness exhibited by many disability applicants at their
disability hearings. These people are by and large honorable
individuals who have been "trapped" by a series of unfortunate
factors, including their own attitudes and background, as well as their
medical, vocational, and educational factors, and fully believe that
they are "disabled" from all productive activities in our society. For
years their primary focus has been on proving their "disability" and
on dealing with and documenting their medical and psychological
impairments. Most have had no vocational referral and have not even
considered the possibility of performing some of the jobs suggested
by a vocational expert at their disability hearing as within their given
functional capacity. The initial concept of "early retirement"
embedded in the disability benefits programs leaves an adjudicator
little option in disability cases but to either deny or grant the benefits
sought. In neither case is the decision necessarily the right one when
considering the best interests of the individual claimant, or society as
a whole. As noted by the Social Security system itself, over half of
the persons denied benefits for disability were not working three
years later and over three-quarters cited health reasons as their main
reason for not working. Obviously over half of these claimants were
not assisted in any way by the Agency, either through an award of
benefits or referral to vocational rehabilitation agencies. Nor am I
convinced that many allowances, especially those based on the
Medical Vocational Guidelines, are necessarily in the best interests of
society or the claimants themselves. As noted in the previous section
on medical advances, one of the most consistent findings in the
medical literature is that exercise in any form seems to improve
health outcomes in most cases. In many ways, work is a forced form
of exercise, often in older individuals the sole inducement to get
physically moving in our culture of television, on-line computer
services and telephones. Add to this the fact that many disability
cases are based upon subjective pain, which can be reduced by the
distraction and socialization inherent in any job, and the finding of
disability becomes even more problematic with respect to the best
interests of the individual involved. For pain, depression and many
common physical ailments the isolation and physical inertia often
resulting from a finding of permanent disability seem exactly the
worst prescription for a worker, especially an older one. As an
Agency that has been made in part responsible for the well being of
people with disabilities, the SSA owes them much more than it is
currently offering in terms of prompt, rational and beneficial
decisions. As the Agency that often is the first and sole contact point
for individuals with disabilities and, the SSA must be more proactive
in informing these individuals of the laws protecting them from
discrimination and of the services available for their treatment,
training, education and other vocational services. As the Agency that
has been noted for its professionalism and compassion, the SSA must
take the lead in giving disabled individuals in our society the
principles of personal empowerment and self-reliance that underlie
the Americans with Disability Act.
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